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Progress in achieving institutional changes should be evaluated through the prism of 
their influence on the development abilities of the relevant country. In Poland, during 20 
years of comprehensive systemic shift, GDP increased more than in any other 
postsocialist country. To judge the transformation progress, it is not enough to review 
improvements in competitiveness or in growth in terms of quantity, but also social and 
cultural aspects should be taken into account. In Poland, there have been five distinct 
periods from the viewpoint of economic growth. Had there been a better policy 
coordination of systemic change and socioeconomic development, GDP growth over the 
periods considered could have increased by more than half. This opportunity was 
missed because of the intermittent implementation of wrong economic policies based on 
wrong economic theories. Poland’s transformation can be seen as a success, but only to 
the extent of achieving two-thirds of its potential.  
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1  The ill-advised ‘Washington consensus’  
After 1989, the historic year that significantly changed the face of not only Poland and 
the region but also the world, came the ‘shock therapy’ years. Or, ‘shock-without-
therapy’ as others would prefer to describe this period more accurately. Economic 
policy in 1990-93 was generally based on the neoliberal doctrine, often identified with 
the so-called Washington consensus, whose usefulness in the complexity of the 
postsocialist transition was limited. A similar tendency could be observed in other post-
socialist countries, albeit not all, as some of these, Slovenia in particular, benefited by 
resisting the influence of the Washington consensus. 
John Williamson, author of the term ‘Washington consensus’, which has become a 
worldwide catchphrase, draws attention to its overzealous interpretation. In particular, 
he distances himself from considering privatization as the overriding priority, as 
happens mainly in the neophyte version of neoliberalism. He notes (2005: 10):  
that privatization remains a desirable objective, but that more attention 
needs to be paid to the way in which it is achieved than has often been 
the case in the past. There needs to be more attention to ensuring that 
privatization is, and is seen to be, squeaky clean. If that restrains the pace 
at which it is carried out, so be it. The objective should not be ‘privatize 
as fast as you can’ (as Kolodko [1998] once claimed the Washington 
consensus demanded), but to privatize in a way that will increase 
efficiency without concentrating wealth.  
Unfortunately, pressurized by the overwhelming influence of external advice there were 
political forces that imposed a programme of liberalization and stabilization, which was 
not relevant to the Polish reality. It turned out to be simple, as it was very easy for 
political reasons to gain social acceptance for the excesses of the shock-without-therapy. 
Nowadays, researchers write about the losers of transformation and the defeat of 
‘Solidarity’ (see Ost 2006), pointing out that critical advice and numerous warning were 
disregarded at that time. However, despite the discord on the alleged absence of a so-
called ‘alternative’, it must be emphasized that other programmes were also suggested 
(see, inter alia, Laski 1990; Nuti 1990; Kolodko 1989, 1990).  
There were distinct warnings that the proposed package of liberalization and 
stabilization, known as the Sachs-Balcerowicz plan, would cause a 25 per cent drop in 
industrial production in the first year. This would be followed by mass unemployment. 
It was not possible that this could result in a monthly inflation rate of 1 per cent, as had 
been promised. The criticism was ridiculed by government advisors although it was 
fully justified, as became obvious later. The government had anticipated the recession to 
last only one year, GDP to drop by 3.1 per cent, and unemployment to effect 400,000 
people (which would imply a moderate unemployment rate of less than 2.5 per cent), all 
to be followed immediately by a period of economic growth (see Program 1989). The 
reality was dramatically different. 
At that time, particularly in 1990-91, efforts at stabilization policy were definitely 
amiss. Policy was too restrictive, mainly in terms of its monetary and fiscal aspects. 
Interest rates were too high and instead of being oriented towards the future and towards 
cooled-down expectations, they were based on earlier inflation rates, a fact which 
caused their extrapolation. What was worse, they also referred to old debt. Foreign trade 2 
liberalization, from which the government had partially withdrawn already in 1991, 
went too far. The range of zloty devaluation was excessive and the period of its nominal 
freeze too long. Furthermore, the freeze was based on an inflexible peg to the US dollar 
and not, as would have been better, to the currencies basket that would have reflected 
the structure of the balance of payment. For political reasons, the public and cooperative 
sectors were discriminated against. Particularly devastating for the badly needed 
restructure of the state companies was the so-called popiwek, a tax on excessive wage 
increases, its restrictiveness evidently overshot. The institutional and social aspects of 
building a market economy had been underestimated. 
Of course, the deep financial destabilization, evident from the high inflation rate and 
extensive shortages,1 as well as a breakdown of external balance, compounded the 
situation. Short-term hyperinflation, induced by the simultaneous liberalization of food 
prices and the irrational, full ex post wage indexation forced by ‘Solidarity’ was 
particularly destructive.  
At the same time, the regime’s initial conditions for a breakthrough, due to earlier 
market reforms and social climate, were quite good. Given the starting point on the one 
hand, and serious conceptual errors on the other, there should be no doubt that the scope 
of transitional recession was much greater than the inevitable outcome. It is obvious that 
more gain could have been achieved at lesser cost but unfortunately, developments were 
different. The government at that time had assumed a much shorter recession period, 
faster stabilization results and a prompt general improvement of the macroeconomic 
situation. The gap between the promised projections and reality was enormous. It had 
far reaching, negative social and political consequences that have lasted even to the 
present day. 
2  A great success for the ‘strategy for Poland’ 
The years 1994-97 constitute another, clearly distinctive period, when a complex 
programme for structural reforms and fast economic growth was implemented. The 
‘Strategy for Poland’ continued all the correct strands of transformation previously 
initiated but without correcting the evident errors of the preceding period. The means of 
economic policy were not confused with its aims. Neoliberal doctrinarism was 
abandoned for a pragmatic approach based on economic rationalism.2 Taxation of wage 
increases, based on the labour productivity growth, was eliminated. Commercialization 
of the public sector was implemented, which meant that state-owned companies were 
exposed to competitive pressure and subjected to tough budget constraints, similarly to 
the private sector. The process of privatization was rationalized, mainly to comply with 
the double goal of improving microeconomic efficiency and maximizing government 
revenue.  
Greater emphasis was attributed to building market economy institutions, and this 
resulted in Poland’s accession in 1996 to the OECD. The scope of constitutionally 
                                                 
1  I have proposed to call this syndrome the ‘shortageflation’. See Kolodko and McMahon (1987).  
2   On the need of a more pragmatic approach towards the issue of economic growth, see Helpman 
(2004) and Rodrik (2005).  3 
guaranteed independence of the central bank was extended. A system of securing bank 
deposits was created (Bank Guarantee Fund). The prerogative of supervision over the 
capital market was increased and an independent insurance supervision established. 
Monetary convertibility conforming to the IMF definition was accepted. The first 
ratings, including investment grade, were obtained. The first foreign bonds were issued. 
Public dialogue and social partnership were basically different than in the preceding 
period. A tripartite commission composed of the government, trade unions and business 
organizations were taking joint action.  
Public debt was radically reduced from approximately 87 per cent of GDP at the end of 
1993 to around 46 per cent at the end of 1997. Inflation dropped by two-thirds, from 
37.6 per cent to 13.2 per cent. With respect to fiscal policy, investment allowances were 
applied to foster development. A reduction of taxes was initiated; in particular, statutory 
decisions reduced taxes for entrepreneurs by as much as one-fifth, from 40 per cent to 
32. Measures to rationalize the budget were introduced, attributing simultaneously to a 
more pro-development nature to the expenses. The increasing inequality of income 
distribution was halted and at the end of the period, the Gini coefficient was 
approximately 0.33 with reference to income and about 0.29 with respect to wages. 
Overall, social climate improved, and the optimism of consumers and entrepreneurs 
grew. According to sociological studies, the number of suicides, used to measure the 
level of social stress, dropped.3 For the first time during the transformation period, more 
citizens were returning to Poland than leaving it. The benefits, as anticipated with the 
‘Strategy for Poland’, had been achieved, but at less cost than expected.4  
The success of this transformation phase has been highlighted by many independent 
authors,5 including such prominent economists as Joseph E. Stiglitz. He writes that 
Poland owes its achievements to the gradual policy of structural reforms and 
institutional building proposed by Kolodko (and implemented when he was in charge of 
economic policy) since the onset of transformation. According to Stiglitz (2004: 181):  
Poland’s former deputy premier and financial minister, Grzegorz   
W. Kolodko, has argued that the success of his nation was due to its 
explicit rejection of the doctrines of the Washington consensus. The 
country did not do what the IMF recommended—it did not engage in 
rapid privatization, and it did not put reducing inflation to lower and 
                                                 
3   Maria Jarosz (2007: 14) , a distinguished Polish sociologist, states:  
  … certain particular case of coincidence of events … took place in the second half of the 
nineties (when Grzegorz W. Kolodko was deputy prime minister and finance minister). An 
extremely spectacular thing happened then: positive economic growth indexes were 
accompanied by a significant drop in negative social ratios: in 1997 GDP grew ... [by] as much 
as 6.9 (which signifies GDP growth of approximately 82 billion zlotys), and usually increasing 
Gini coefficient (measuring inequality of income distribution) was halted at that time. At the 
same time the unemployment rate ... dropped to 10.3 in 1997 (i.e., unemployment was reduced 
by over a million people). The above was accompanied by significant temporary reduction of 
the ever-growing suicide rate: from 14.1 to 13.0 (over 400 people less). And even though it is 
not easy to interpret the above, there comes the reflection over the unusual situation where 
what should be growing grew, and what should be dropping dropped .  
4  For a comprehensive analysis of the assumptions and implementation of the ‘Strategy for Poland’ 
against the comparative background of shock therapy, see Kolodko and Nuti (1997).  
5   See, for instance, North (2002), Nekipelov (2004), Roland (2004) and Popov (2006).  4 
lower levels over all other macroeconomic concerns. But it did 
emphasize some things to which the IMF had paid insufficient 
attention—such as the importance of democratic support for the reforms, 
which entailed trying to keep unemployment low, providing benefits for 
those who were unemployed and adjusting pensions for inflation, and 
creating the institutional infrastructure required to make a market 
economy function. 
This is true. The instruments of development policy were not confused with its 
objectives. 
The objective of building a social market economy was moved forward as much as was 
possible in the presence of both globalization and the strong neoliberal trend in the 
world’s economic thinking and practice.6 Creating the basics of a social market 
economy in a postsocialist country was difficult because of the growing subordination 
of the economy to the impulsive forces of world economy. Also, the favouring of 
foreign capital by some political and economic elites, who were not interested in 
strengthening the institutions of social market economy, was of certain importance. 
Notwithstanding the weaknesses of economic policy, the main problem was that social 
market economy is a concept that refers to national economy, yet these day, the world 
economy is predominant. 
Poland would have had an opportunity to create a social market economy if it had 
subsequently continued with the ‘Strategy for Poland’ plan for the last 20 years. 
Unfortunately, this did not happen, partly for doctrinal and ideological reasons and 
partly because, as happens frequently, economic policy is subordinated to group 
interests imposed on society as a common goal. 
In the context of the undeniable achievements of 1994-97, some of the comments 
offered as professional forecasts, yet expressed as bad-luck wishes, should be recalled 
here. They included comments such as:  
–  a ‘forthcoming threat’ (L. Balcerowicz, former deputy prime minister and 
finance minister); 
–  the phantom of ‘300 per cent inflation’ (J. K. Bielecki, former prime minister); 
and  
–  a ‘national disaster’ (J. Winiecki, former representative of Poland in EBRD). 
Unfortunately, in some foreign circles, these prophecies had a negative influence on 
general opinion with respect to Poland’s economic perspectives. However, thanks to 
hard facts and rational arguments, the situation was soon under control.  
Instead of defeat, the Polish economy exhibited spectacular success between 1994 and 
1997 and was recognized as the unquestionable leader of postsocialist change. At that 
time Poland earned the nickname, East European tiger, but regrettably, not for long. The 
nonorthodox, pragmatic policy, which had triggered the per capita GDP growth of 28 
                                                 
6   An important contribution dealing with the influence of neoliberal doctrine on the economic dialogue 
and thus on the contemporary world economy is Harvey (2005). See also Kolodko (2006).  5 
per cent in 1994-97, was foolishly interrupted. The favourable trends were soon 
reversed.  
3  Overcooling and counteracting its aftermath  
Then came the disastrous years, 1998-2001, when there were attempts to combine the 
returning orthodox liberalism with the populism of ‘Solidarity’. The results were even 
worse than at the beginning of the decade. Despite progress in some sections of 
institution building and the quickly extending private sector, economic dynamism faded. 
As a result of the policy of cooling the economic situation with fiscal and monetary 
instruments, the GDP growth rate dropped from 7.5 per cent in the second quarter of 
1997 to 0.2 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2001, and the 1997 level growth rate has not 
been achieved since then. Unemployment, which had dropped by over a million people 
during 1994-97, increased by the same number between 1998 and 2001.  
Measures had been taken unnecessarily to cool down the economy, as it had not been 
overheated. Although there had been some tension with regard to the balance of 
payment, this did not constitute any serious risk until 1997. The current account deficit 
had been at a manageable level of 3.2 per cent of GDP, of which almost 93 per cent was 
financed by FDI inflows. The inflow of FDIs reflected the rather positive general 
economic stance and pointed to the improved competitiveness of the Polish economy. 
But by 1999 the deficit had already reached 7.4 per cent of GDP, and again a specific 
perverse effect occurred. Similar to the situation in 1991 when a high budget deficit 
appeared after the temporary surplus of the previous year, likewise, the current account 
deficit in 1998-99 was two and a half times higher than in 1996-97. Compared to 1997, 
the nominal state budget deficit in 1998 had doubled. Apart from 2004, the year 2000 
was the only year of significant acceleration of inflation, increasing from 7.3 per cent to 
10.1 per cent (see Statistical Appendix for details).  
The above development evolved in an environment of the Polish economy opening to 
external contacts, grassroots businesses flourishing, microeconomic management 
improving, and progress being made in staff qualifications. How, then, was it possible? 
The answer is complex, both for psychological and political reasons. With regard to the 
economy, the answer is simple: wrong economic policy based on the wrong theoretical 
concept. The Polish neoliberalism, which had been combined with right-wing populism, 
could have produced no other result except to impede prosperity and to drive the 
economy to stagnation. Social costs of the overcooling policy were enormous and its 
economic effects poor.  
Then came the fourth period, 2002-05. It was the final and key stage of negotiations of 
Poland’s membership in the European Union (EU). Poland could not stay outside EU, 
as the country was geopolitically placed within a broader, European context.7 However, 
many important issues, including those relating to fiscal and monetary areas, anti-trust 
regulations and competition policy, agricultural market, infrastructure and environment 
                                                 
7   According to a rather odd comment, it was membership in NATO by East and Central European 
countries, decided by the USA, that made their subsequent EU accession possible (Brzezinski 2007). 
It is a classical post hoc ergo propter hoc mistake, i.e., ‘after this, therefore because of this’, clutched 
with classical Americacentrism. 6 
protection, needed to be negotiated. The second half of 2002, preceding the EU summit 
in Copenhagen, was crucial and Poland was able to negotiate the maximum extent of all 
that were achievable. However, with respect to the entire, multi-year negotiation 
procedure, more benefit could have been achieved through the coordinated efforts of 
other countries applying for EU accession.  
Apart from the favourable conclusion of the EU negotiations and the social support for 
the accession that succeeded at the June 2003 referendum, the most important issue was 
to prevent the economy from stagnation, and to steer it again towards fast growth. This 
was both easier and more difficult than similar action taken eight years earlier after the 
failed shock-without-therapy measures. Intervention was somewhat easier, as 
advancement of the market economy was significant, but also more difficult, as policy 
had fewer instruments available. The measures still at the government’s disposal were 
used as much as was possible, given that the central bank’s monetary policy was 
evidently a hindrance to economic boom. Correcting monetary policy mistakes through 
fiscal policy adjustments is not a good modus operandi. Poland missed out on its 
potential for economic growth because of insufficient coordination of financial policy—
monetary policy of the central bank and fiscal policy of the government. 
A single, sharp adjustment was made in the second half of 2002 and in the beginning of 
2003 in the form of nonorthodox action. The debts of over 60,000 companies, 99 per 
cent of which were small- and medium-sized private enterprises, were conditionally 
cancelled. According to independent centres, for instance, the Supreme Technical 
Organization, NOT, this measure saved approximately 210,000 jobs. Saving thousands 
of companies from bankruptcy by means of extensive restrictive fiscal and monetary 
measures (including excessive currency appreciation supported by the National Bank of 
Poland) soon resulted in a reversal of the unfavourable trends. Production grew 
increasingly faster, as employment started to grow as well. The government budgetary 
stance and payment balance improved, and by the middle of 2003, GDP grew by 4.0 per 
cent, and by as much as 7.0 per cent during the first quarter of 2004. In 2005 this 
momentum, unfortunately, could not be maintained. GDP dropped temporarily to 3.5 
per cent due to the general incoherence of macroeconomic policy. 
Notwithstanding the single debt-clearance operation and general increased effectiveness 
resulting from the continuous improvement of business management quality, the 
structural reform and institutional progress triggered by the upcoming EU membership 
were of great importance in accelerating the rate of economic growth. Without a doubt, 
in this respect, the government and the entire state apparatus was efficient. This 
facilitated the introduction of many institutional improvements on an on-going basis, 
without waiting for EU membership. 
However, the implementation of the multi-layer programme of structural reforms was of 
crucial importance. The programme integrated and organized activities in many sectors, 
although its name, ‘Programme of the Reform of Public Finance’ could mistakenly 
suggest coordination in only one sector.8 This reform package was not limited only to 
consolidating public finance, where there was still so much to do, but has been   
 
                                                 
8   See Kolodko (2004) for more details on the assumptions, instruments and initial outcome of the 
implementation of ‘Programme of the Reform of Public Finance’.  7 
Figure 1 









































GDP Unemployment (right scale)  
Note:  Unemployment rate is based on conditions comparable with the 1990s data. According to the 
methodology currently applied, this is approximately 2 percentage points higher.  
Source: GUS.   
continued under different names until the present times. This refers to another radical 
reduction in company taxation, which after being decreased by a mere 4 percentage 
points between 1998 and 2001, was lowered again, this time by 9 percentage points 
(from 28 per cent in 2002 to 19 per cent from the year 2004 onward).9 Although this 
also contributed to the acceleration of the growth rate, the most important element of the 
‘Programme’ was to reconstruct the financing of public services sphere and to continue 
with social security reforms. In these fields there was still a lot to do in the following 
periods.  
The years 2006-08 constitute the fifth stage of the 20-year transformation period. 
Generally, positive economic trends were maintained, and the average annual growth 
rate was close to 6 per cent (a decent result), although Poland had the potential to reach 
a growth rate of approximately 7 per cent. At a growth rate of 7.2 per cent, income 
should double every ten years. The measures adopted were sufficient to maintain the 
dynamics of the 1997 spring for the next ten years, and GDP would not have been 50 
per cent higher but instead, twice as high. Recently, i.e., in 2006-08, this rather good 
economic situation was sustained not only because of the high quality of 
macroeconomic policy or further improvement of the institutions, but for four other 
reasons: 
–  positive inertia of processes initiated in the preceding period; 
–  noticeable improvement of the quality of microeconomic management at the 
company level;  
–  development of local governments which supported local initiative and 
stimulated regional development; and 
                                                 
9  It should be clearly pointed out that of the 21 percentage-point reduction on corporate income tax 
amounting to 40 per cent in the beginning of the 1990s, only 4 percentage points were the effect of a 
government decision in 1998-2001. Measures introduced in the ‘Strategy for Poland’ and the 
‘Programme of the Reform of Public Finance’ account for 17 percentage points.  8 
–  institutional, financial and investment benefits resulting from EU membership, 
the effect of which is estimated as an additional annual growth of GDP rate of 
approximately 2 percentage points.  
To summarize, of the 80 per cent GDP growth achieved during the 19 years of 
transformation (1990-200), almost two-thirds (or as much as 47 percentage points) was 
achieved the eight-year period between 1994-97 and 2002-05. The total span of eight 
years covering the years 1990-93 and 1998-2001 resulted in zero growth. In terms of 
economic dynamics, this was the difference between the ‘Strategy for Poland’ and the 
‘Programme of the Reform of Public Finance’ on the one hand, and shock therapy and 
overcooling of the economy on the other.  
Thus, the most damaging policy was followed in the four-year period, 1998-2001, and 
was even worse than in the beginning of the last decade, albeit with a smaller area of 
uncertainty. It should be emphasized once again that faulty economic theory can only 
lead to damaging economic policy. Nothing can justify it. Of course, the interests of 
particular groups were of major importance as well. 
4  Different measures of the reforms’ progress, and social and economic 
development  
Evaluation of the transition process is more than a mere assessment of economic 
growth, measured by GDP increases. There are many other related processes that have 
both occasional and long-term implications. Consideration of the changes in GDP 
distribution is not sufficient either. It is true that distribution irregularities evidently 
intensified during transformation (see IMF 2007b), and social exclusion expanded, 
resulting in compounded costs: human capital was wasted and additional budget costs 
incurred, shifting these away from pro-development applications. Also in this case, the 
situation worsened largely during the period of shock-without-therapy and unnecessary 
overcooling. The level of the inequality seems to be stabilizing over the last few years, 
as it can be estimated from minimal changes in the Gini coefficient. General debate, 
however, refers to the question of whether a level counterproductive to economic 
growth has already been reached (see Tanzi, Chu and Gupta 1999) and whether the tax 
changes that shift income from the low-wage groups to the better-paid groups (the so-
called ‘flat tax’), proposed by neoliberal circles, would influence growth. 
Recently, Poland has been outdistanced by Latvia in terms of income per person. 
Therefore, with a GDP per capita of approximately US$17,800 in 2008 (based on the 
purchasing power parity), Poland outranks only Bulgaria and Romania among the ten 
postsocialist EU member states. Income in Poland corresponds to half the entire EU 
average, which fluctuated around US$34,000 in 2008, or less than half of the USA 
average of US$48,000.  
At the same time, Poland compares fairly well with respect to the human development 
index (HDI) compiled by the United Nations Development Programme (see UNDP 
2007). Norway ranks the highest with an index of 0.965, Niger with 0.311 the lowest. 
Poland with HDI of 0.862 was ranked by UNDP in the group of 63 high-index states, 
whose index exceeds 0.800. It is worth mentioning that this level was also reached by 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the GDP per person is approximately 40 per cent of the 9 
corresponding figure in Poland. This alone highlights how the growth trend is affected if 
the quantitative index of gross product is overlooked, and consideration given, for 
instance, to the two parameters that are essential for the quality of social capital. 
Given the size of its GDP per capita, Poland ranks 50th in the world (according to a 
ranking that takes into account the UN member states and Hong Kong). In terms of 
HDI, it is in 37th position, situated between Argentina and Chile, a position higher than 
six other postsocialist EU states, including Estonia (0.858), Lithuania (0.857), Slovakia 
(0.856) and Latvia (0.845), all of which enjoy a higher GDP per capita than Poland. 
Poland also outranks Bulgaria (0.816) and Romania (0.805). Thus, of the ten 
postsocialist EU countries, only Slovenia (27th position with HDI of 0.910) the Czech 
Republic (0.885), and Hungary (0.869) are better off. 
Next comes an interesting question. To what extent is this arrangement, so different 
from the results based on GDP rates, the outcome of postsocialist systemic 
transformation and to what extent did it result from the general heritage of the previous 
system? There is no doubt that this time, heritage was an advantage. Under the centrally 
planned socialist economy, a common public health service existed, and these countries 
initiated transition supported by societies where illiteracy had been eliminated already 
in the early stages of socialism. In addition to primary schooling, secondary and tertiary 
education networks were well developed, and their positive impact has continued to the 
present. For the same reasons, Cuba (with a GDP per person of only US$4,000) ranks 
extremely high in the HDI list with the index of 0.826 (surpassing its neighbour, 
Mexico, and Bulgaria among postsocialist countries). In comparison, countries at a 
similar level of average national income, such as Syria or Indonesia, are characterized 
with an HDI index that is over a hundred basis points less (0.716 and 0.711, 
respectively).  
HDI improved in Poland during the transition years relatively more than in other 
countries because of the high increase in attendance at the tertiary education level. 
Dynamic development of private tertiary educational entities—unquestionably relating 
to transformation—and the significant increase in the number of students (currently 
almost two million, up from the 400,000 at the start of transition) contributed to the 
phenomenon. Apart from the quality (often very low) of education offered in many 
private colleges, the almost fivefold increase in enrolments over a period of less than 
two decades is impressive, and has had a significant impact on HDI improvement. 
It is true that HDI increased during transformation by more than 100 basis points from 
less than 0.760 to over 0.860 if calculated with a methodology that enables comparison. 
However, it is also a fact that the main observation is confirmed once again. During 
1990-03, the years of failure from the policy of extreme shocks without sufficient 
therapy, Poland’s relative position in the world dropped by as much as a dozen places. 
The HDI shows only certain amount of growth in 1993, a reflection of the abating crisis 
and implementation of the governmental programme known as the ‘Pact on State 
Companies in the Course of Transformation’ that had been agreed with the trade unions. 
It was a belated attempt to rescue the rapidly deteriorating situation of workers who 
were affected by quickly increasing unemployment. It should be mentioned here that 
unemployment—a fact that obviously influences social condition—is not considered in 
 10 
Table 1 
Human Development Index in Poland in 1990-2004 
Year  HDI  Comparable HDI in 1992-96a  Position in the world
1990 0.807    43 
1991b  n. d.    n. d. 
1992 0.815  0.765  49 
1993 0.875c 0.781  56 
1994 0.864  0.786  58 
1995 0.883  0.796  52 
1996 0.886  0.801  44 
1997 0.809d   44 
1998 0.818    44 
1999 0.823    38 
2000 0.848    37 
2001 0.841    35 
2002 0.850    37 
2003 0.858    36 
2004 0.862    37 
Notes:  a  Indexes for 1992-96 were calculated pursuant to the method applied after the change 
introduced by UNDP in 1997 which enables comparison of the timeseries 1992-2004.    
  b  n. d. = no data; 
  c  Change in calculation method applied in 1993; 
  d  Second change in calculation method becoming effective from 1997 onward. 
Source:   UNDP (2006).  
the HDI. During the period 1998-2001, when policy resulted in a disappointing 
outcome, the great boom in private tertiary education contributed to the HDI increase, 
albeit only until the year 2000. 
During the last year of overcooling, the situation deteriorated still further and in 2001 
HDI dropped in absolute terms. It was the only incident during the entire transformation 
period of irrational macroeconomic policy bringing down the economic growth rate to 
zero by the end of the year. Four and a half years—and in favourable external 
circumstances, at that10—was sufficient time to plunge a 7.5 per cent growth rate to 
zero. This was the result of the inability to coordinate policies on institutional reform 
with those on economic growth. They are complementary policies, and in a country 
maturing to a full market economy, under no circumstances should measures undertaken 
for institutional reform be substituted for those that are indispensable for economic 
progress.  
But neither money nor an increasing human development index brings happiness. 
Interesting research is being carried out at the junctions of economy and psychology. In 
addition to psychical and physical circumstances, this field of study aims to define and 
measure people’s satisfaction, which is a function of more than the level of income, 
education and health. Account is being taken of cultural values, as well as the condition 
                                                 
10 The Russian crisis was of marginal importance for Poland’s economic performance. At that time, its 
significance was exaggerated by pro-governmental economists, analysts and media. The situation in 
Russia was much worse in 1994-97, but at that time there was no-one who blamed the country’s 
neighbours for difficulties that are inevitable.  11 
of the natural environment, level of satisfaction with the method of exercising power 
and the functioning of civil institutions. Comparative studies have led to fascinating 
results, on which the first world happiness map was based.11  
Based on detailed statistical data and multi-subject survey research, a compound 
subjective wellbeing index, ranging between 100-300 points (SWB) was created.12 
Hundred and seventy-eight countries have been classified, and Denmark and 
Switzerland top the list with 273 points. Next are Austria and Iceland with 260 points, 
Burundi is in the last place with 100 points. Only Congo and Zimbabwe (each scoring 
110 points) separate Ukraine (120) and Moldova (117) from Burundi, which is at the 
bottom of the list.  
With the SWB index, the correlation with GDP is significantly weaker than in the HDI 
comparison. What is remarkable, however, is that other postsocialist countries are also 
ranked quite low in the SWB list, even those nations classified by UNDP as belonging 
to the higher HDI country group. Lithuania and Latvia are in joint 154-155th position, 
with 157 points; Bulgaria rates the 164th place with 143 points. Russians are as 
unhappy as the citizens of Pakistan and Swaziland. If these research outcomes are to be 
believed, then happiness is mainly dependent on non-material living conditions. Even 
though the wealthiest nations top the list (apart from Bhutan and Costa Rica), a stronger 
correlation than the income rate is observed with nature as well as with traditional and 
cultural values. Even Slovenia, the wealthiest country among postsocialist nations and 
leading all lists with respect to GDP and HDI rates, scores 220 point. This is the same 
score as Kyrgyzstan, a poor picturesque, mountainous country that is outdistanced by 
Mongolia with 223 points in 57th place (with Fiji and Israel). Lagging behind is Poland, 
tied with Croatia, with 197 points (placed in 98th and 99th positions). Poland is also 
outranked by Iran (200 point) but is slightly better placed than South Korea (193 
points). Within the group of socialist and postsocialist countries, the Czech Republic 
(213 points), China and Cuba (each with 210 points), as well as Tajikistan and Vietnam 
(203 points each) come before Poland. Kazakhstan (193) and Hungary (190) are behind 
Poland, but just by a few points. 
Whether this ranking can be verified would require further interdisciplinary comparative 
studies. Such studies are very interesting, as they go beyond the domain of economy. 
Daniel Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2002 in this field. He deals with both 
behavioural finance and hedonistic psychology, and emphasizes the importance of the 
exact factors considered in SWB for creating social satisfaction (Kahneman 2003). 
Although somewhat removed from the presented results, these factors cannot be 
disregarded. Their oversight would constitute a similar mistake, albeit on a different 
level, to the one made by neoliberal economy in confusing the means of economic 
policy with its aims.  
Drawing robust conclusions with the SWB index is difficult because of the absence of a 
timeseries and hence the inability to handle comparisons over time; only comparisons 
concerning space are possible. However, when taking into account the individual 
indexes that make up this collective indicator, it could be assumed that also in this field 
Poland exhibited progress, given the longer timescale. Yet, fluctuations occur here as 
                                                 
11 The world happiness map has been developed at the University of Leicester; see White (2007).  
12  On the methodology of the estimation of SWB index, see Marks et al. (2006).  12 
well. This is obvious in comparing the optimism of the mid-1990s with the periods that 
immediately preceded and followed. Similar situation was evident for some time from 
the second half of 2002, but again, not for long. Nevertheless, during the last few years, 
the SWB level has been adversely affected by the negative attitude with respect to 
Poland’s political life. Its poor quality, if not in absolute terms, then surely in relative 
terms, erodes the subjective sense of social satisfaction of the Poles. 
5  The consequences of economic policy mistakes 
Some of the mistakes can never be rectified, not even over a long timeframe. Non-
generated income is lost for ever. The only exception are cases when resignation from 
current income refers to giving up the job that generated the income so that the available 
time thus obtained is invested in favour of higher education, and labour productivity and 
production in the future. If one works less—subsequently producing and earning less in 
a given period—but invests more in study, then the resulting increase in labour 
productivity may in the future compensate for the loss of the potential, 
possibly-to-be-generated income. On the other hand, if the extra time is wasted or used 
unwisely, the loss is irretrievable. 
We are getting to the heart of the matter. Thus, when viewed from a strictly economic 
standpoint, a lot more could have been in Poland achieved during transformation, 
particularly with respect to the level of production and consumption. Poland missed the 
opportunity for greater GDP growth. It could have exceeded the level of Portugal, or 
been equivalent to Slovenia or Greece, totalling over US$30,000 per person. Reality, at 
approximately US$18,000, is just two-thirds of the foregoing: a two-thirds rate of 
success.  
Without resorting to complicated deliberations and complex econometric models, it can 
be assumed that given the absence of any major exogenous disturbance, it should have 
been possible for Poland to achieve at least the economic growth rates projected in 
government programmes. It must be emphasized that criticism from professional circles 
was limited mainly to the growth rate not being sufficiently high, and not the other way 
around. Available potential had been overlooked. In the final phase of the second period 
in 1997, it was suggested that the 7 per cent growth rate was too low, and it was 
announced that GDP would doubt within the next 10 years. This could have been 
possible at that time, but on certain conditions, referring in particular to the elimination 
of the infrastructural bottleneck. It is an obstacle but at the same time an opportunity, 
because infrastructural projects, next to exports, should be one of the main flywheels of 
economic development. Unfortunately, economic policy is a history of missed 
opportunities. 
In retrospect, it is evident that both in the first and in the third periods, much greater 
momentum had been assumed than was actually achieved. At the turn of the two 
preceding decades, unrealistic forecasting was quite common. In particular, government 
economists were generous with optimistic plans, forecasting a GDP growth of 23 per 
cent (!) for 1991-93, whereas it actually dropped 2 per cent in all.13 Estimates by 
                                                 
13  See Gomulka (1990). Interestingly enough, the author of this forecast was nominated to the post of 
deputy minister of finance in the fall of 2007, while another advisor from the shock-without-therapy 13 
independent research centres, both domestic and foreign, were more balanced, but also 
projected higher growth rates than those achieved. Such assumptions were shared by the 
experts of international organizations, principally the World Bank and IMF. 
Considering the prestige of these agencies and their possibilities of applying pressure, 
which was much greater then than at present, their voice had great significance. In fact 
many of these ambitious plans could have been implemented, but not with the economic 
policy pursued at that time. The formulation of advice, development of economic 
programmes and the review thereof is one thing, but having ability to implement them is 
another matter.  
Actual annual growth rates should be compared with the forecasts projected in 
governmental programmes and by international organizations, as well as by the 
renowned experts who monitor the Polish economy. This is done by analytical centres, 
rating institutions, investment banks, and research centres. In a simple model, the year 
1990 index applied by the government was adopted, and forecasted for the next three 
years by the vice-president and chief economist of the World Bank at that time (see 
Summers 1992) who was working closely with the Polish government. For the years 
1998-2003 we conservatively assumed almost half a point less than the projection that 
could have resulted from continuing the trend of the preceding four-year period, while 
in the hypothetical variant we maintained the same growth rates for the years 1994-97 
as were actually attained.14 For the years 2004-07, indexes are taken from the 
‘Programme of the Reform of Public Finance’. It should, in fact, be noted that GDP 
growth was on average a mere 0.5 points less than the hypothetical and aggregated rate 
for the entire period of 2004-07, or 2.4 points less in total (the difference between the 
assumed 25.5 per cent and actual 23.1 per cent growth rate).  
This gives an average annual growth rate of 5.5 per cent for the entire 19-year period 
(1990-2008), taking into account the GDP growth of 4.8 per cent in 2008. Without 
going into details, it must be emphasized that such assumptions were supported by 
reliable economic models and econometric forecasts. In each case, comprehensive 
studies were the basis of the indexes used here. Similarly to the present when 
government estimates on the average annual GDP growth rates of 5.1 and 5.2 per cent 
for the years 2006-10 and 2011-15, respectively, are based on comprehensive 
econometric models,15 state-of-the-arts requirements were used in the past to prepare 
plans, scenarios and forecasts. This observation refers to forecasts prepared by both the 
government and other analytical centres. The estimates were supported by a good 
survey of the reality of the Polish economy and its external environment. Therefore, if 
reality is less promising than the forecasts, then we are dealing with policy errors and 
not forecast errors.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
period, who had ridiculed the warning about the 25 per cent drop in industrial output in 1990 was 
appointed the minister of finance… So, there is policy and there is politics. And, of course, there is 
feedback between both of them.  
14 ‘Strategy for Poland’ assumed GDP to grow by a total of 21.8 per cent for 1994-97, which was to be 
the result of growth of 4.5, 5.0, 5.2, and 5.5 per cent in the subsequent years. In fact GDP in total 
increased by 6.2 points more and average growth rate (6.4) surpassed the initial forecast of 5.4 per 
cent by 1 percentage point. 
15  See Program (2006).  14 
6 What  if… 
These forecasts provided the foundation for the decisions made by economic agents as 
well as by households and companies. Consumers and investors formulated their own 
expectations based on these forecasts. Consequently, these expectations partially 
influenced economic behaviour by initiating economic activity, the flow of income and 
movement of stocks.  
The growth rate was almost 1 percentage points less than the annual average observed 
during the implementation of the ‘Strategy for Poland’. For comparison, this was half 
the growth rate of China for the last two decades. The 5.5 per cent growth rate is also 
slightly higher than the current rate for the entire world, whose gross product increased 
between 2005-08 on average by no less than 5.1 per cent.16  
It must be added here that this refers to the global product growth rate, not per capita 
rate. In Poland’s case, the situation is more or less the same. Contrary to global trends 
and Poland’s past, the scale of GDP growth per capita is larger, not smaller, than the 
GDP overall, reflecting the country’s high net emigration in 2005-08. In other words, 
despite overall GDP stagnation, GDP per person rose by an index equal to net migration 
rates. 
Thus, the assumption of an average annual GDP growth rate of 5.5 per cent was not 
unreasonable, and could have been achieved. At the time it had appeared that it would 
have been sufficient to implement an adequate growth strategy for the entire 
transformation period in junction with a creative policy of system change. Regrettably, 
during the 18-year postsocialist period, the average rate was a mere 3.0 per cent. Such a 
disappointing outcome had not been foreseen by anyone in the initial stages of the 
transition, particularly as production and living standards in the previous period had 
improved much faster. In the 40-year period covering the years 1950-89, national net 
income had, on average, expanded at 6.7 per cent per annum (i.e., twice as fast as in the 
subsequent two decades, 1990-2009).17  
It should be no surprise that also this fact was considered as part of the negative image 
of the times. Another issue was the fact that the growth path was beset with problems 
regarding the level of the development process. Consequently, the previous system that 
had introduced the transformation was abandoned. It is also noteworthy that at that time 
there were periods of a cyclic nature, with a relative regularity of fluctuations and 
successive phases of growth rate acceleration and deceleration.18  
The range of unrecoverable losses is huge. It is reflected not only in the difference 
between the current income, at nearly 180 per cent of the 1989 level, and the 
hypothetical level of 260 per cent, but by the entire field between the curve of 
hypothetical GDP growth and its actual trajectory.  
                                                 
16  For 2005-06, actual data from IMF; for 2007-08, IMF forecast (2007b).  
17 After two subsequent years, average long-term index is anticipated to improve slightly and, assuming 
the average 2008-09 GDP growth rate of around 5.0 per cent, growth for the first 20 years of 
transformation (1990-2009) will average between 3.1 and 3.2 per cent  
18 For more details on the subject of cyclical economic growth under socialist planned economy, see 
Kolodko and Gruszczynski (1975), Bauer (1978) and Kolodko (1979, 2002).  15 
Table 2 
Actual and hypothetical GDP growth rate in Poland,  
1990-2007 (in per cent) 
Year Actual  What  if...   Year Actual  What  if... 
1990 -11.6  -3.1   1999 4.5  6.7 
1991 -7.3  2.0    2000  4.2  6.7 
1992 2.3  5.5    2001  1.1  6.7 
1993 3.5  5.5    2002  1.4  6.7 
1994 5.2  5.2    2003  3.8  6.7 
1995 7.0  7.0    2004  5.3  5.0 
1996 6.2  6.2    2005  3.5  5.4 
1997 7.1  7.1    2006  6.1  6.0 
1998 5.0  6.7    2007  6.5  7.0 
Source  Actual data obtained from GUS. Hypothetical data obtained as explained in the text.  
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What if… GDP growth, 1990-2007 (1989=100)  
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Actual gross product is over 17,000 zlotys per person less than what could have been 
achieved; based on conditions in 2007, it is around 30,000 zlotys instead of 
approximately 47,000. However, the loss is much bigger, as negative effects 
accumulate. Aggregated flows over the years 1990-2007 give the stock of income not 
generated and therefore not consumed nor invested, with implications for the future 
totalling a massive 5.7 trillion zlotys. This is equivalent to a 5-year period of GDP at the 
2007 rate, equivalent to approximately 150,000 zlotys per capita (or, the loss per 
person). 
Currently, 20 years after the historic year of 1989, the average income of a typical Pole 
is almost 80 per cent higher; this also applies to citizens who were born at that time, are 
now graduating from high school and are looking forward to university. This is a sign of 
the passing times. It is a pity, then, that it has not always been used wisely. While the 
improvement is two-thirds more than what the previous generation enjoyed, at the same 
time it also implies that a third of the potential has been lost. On the one hand, we 
should be pleased: in a moderate comparison to others and in view of the past, it is a 
two-thirds success rate in growth. But on the other hand, we should be concerned about 
the wasted one-third.  16 
In 2008, Polish GDP could have already reached around 260 per cent of the 1989 level. 
The magnitude could have been slightly more, or perhaps slightly less but is, 
nevertheless, the order of magnitude we refer to. Following from this, the country’s 
economic and political position within the EU and in the world would have been 
stronger; international competitiveness of Polish companies better, and subsequently, 
also the level of consumption and living standards. The quality of social capital and the 
level of people’s satisfaction would correspondingly have been higher as well, but 
whether people would have been happier, is quite a different matter.  
7 Conclusions 
In conclusion, I would like to propose seven lessons that other postsocialist transition 
economies and emerging-market countries should consider from Poland’s thorny, yet 
somewhat successful, road to free market economy, political democracy and civil 
society.  
7.1 Lesson  one 
Economic reforms that increase the flexibility of markets and contribute at least 
partially towards building the institutions necessary for efficient functioning and 
development of a market economy are always a prerequisite when a bolder, more 
profound structural shift is introduced. Even if extensive changes are not possible for 
political or cultural reasons, it makes sense to adopt changes gradually because this, in 
time, is likely to bring the desired results. This is not to imply that partial reforms will 
gain due recognition later, as they most likely will not, but this does not change the fact 
that moderate changes have taken place and these may be helpful for long-term 
development. Politically speaking, certain individuals work to promote political benefits 
while others reap the rewards, but most important thing is the gain for the society, the 
economy and the country.  
7.2 Lesson  two 
Only a proper mix of two policies (policies oriented towards a system change and for 
development oriented towards the accumulation and efficient allocation of capital) 
offers the opportunity for rapid economic growth and sustainable development. The 
neglect of either component precludes good outcome. Apart from Poland, this is amply 
demonstrated by the adverse experience of Russia in the 1990s and the positive 
developments of China. 
7.3 Lesson  three 
Confusing the means and ends in economic policy can backfire, increasing the social 
costs of development and reducing the level of attainment. This mistake was common in 
Poland, among others, and was not restricted to any specific period: mixing up policy 
goals and instruments is a widespread phenomenon in the modern world. When the 
means become glorified, they are perceived as the ultimate goals, as was the case in 
Poland in the late 1990s. The economy stagnated, despite the progress being made in 
institution  building, privatization efforts and the ongoing process of opening up the 
economy. 17 
7.4 Lesson  four 
During an attempt at a substantial transformation of a political system, when 
liberalization and opening up of the economy are linked with integration into the global 
system, institution building is of fundamental importance. Creation of the new rules of 
the market economic game and a legal, organizational framework for their 
implementation is imperative, but so is policy. Ever-improving institutions by 
themselves do not entail—at least not in the short-term perspective—an ever-improving 
policy. It may, in fact, be steadily deteriorating. Policy also depends on other factors, 
such as economic doctrine, dominant political set-up and the skills (or the paucity of 
skills) of those who conduct economic policy. Institutions matter, but so does policy. 
7.5 Lesson  five 
The main source of development financing in the so-called emerging markets has been, 
and continues to be, domestic capital accumulation. Therefore, the formation of this 
capital should be given the necessary priority in macroeconomic policy and in 
microeconomic incentives. Particularly important in this respect is the appropriate 
design of financial policy, both fiscal and monetary, which significantly affects the 
marginal propensity to save and thus has a fundamental influence on the overall rate of 
capital accumulation, the investment level and dynamics.  
7.6 Lesson  six 
Globalization, unavoidable and seemingly irreversible, creates additional development 
opportunities but also new challenges. Therefore, the art of economic policymaking 
today encompasses the apt handling of dilemmas that may emerge in new 
circumstances. The mini-max rule should be followed: minimize threats, maximize 
opportunities—or, more precisely, reduce the inevitable costs of participation in the 
global economic game and increase the benefits thereof. 
7.7 Lesson  seven 
Economic policy is simultaneously a technocratic and social endeavour. The neglect of 
either aspect automatically decreases the effectiveness of the policy. It is not enough 
that limited groups of experts know what to do; this knowledge must be shared by broad 
sectors of society, albeit it then develops into a different type of knowledge. The best 
results in economic policy are triggered by an appropriate mix of financial and social 
engineering, technocratic macroeconomic governance and genuine social dialog, 
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Inflation (consumer price index), 1991-2008  
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